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This study is set out to explore how cognitive biases, gambler’s fallacy and hot
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Insurance is a vital tool to protect people from losses such as unexpected
accidents or significant financial catastrophes. Farmers are especially vulnerable to
financial harm caused by low probability high consequence events such as drought, flood
or disease.1 Crops are commodities without brand attributes, meaning farmers are more
vulnerable to price fluctuations from selling the undifferentiated products.
Brief history of Federal crop insurance program
In the United States, a variety of crop insurance programs have been developed
and regulated by the government, but delivered to farmers by private insurance
companies. Meanwhile, the federal government also offers farmers a considerable
number of subsidies to reduce the costs. Established on a small scale in 1938, the U.S.
federal crop insurance program has grown into a sizable risk management system with
numerous programs holding a total liability exceeding $123.6 billion and a coverage of
296.2 million acres in 2013 (Figure1.1 and Figure 1.2). However, this has been
accompanied by a significant cost to the taxpayers, and government expenditure on crop

This state of the world is no different than people/firms living/operating in flood, forest fire, hurricane and earthquake areas, as well
as in foreign countries.
1

1

insurance is expected to exceed all other spending on farm commodity programs during
the fiscal periods 2011 to 2020 (Bulut et al., 2012).

Figure 1.1

2

Insured Acres from 1989 to 2013 in United States2

The data source from current year-to-date national summary of summary reports,
http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html
2

Figure 1.2

Crop Insurance Liabilities From 1989 to 2013 in United States3

Federal crop insurance was first authorized in 1938 in a support of Roosevelt’s
presidential campaign. In the first 40 years of its existence, only limited types of crops
and a limited number of counties were eligible for coverage. The Federal Crop Insurance
Act of 1980 came into effect and expanded the coverage for more types of crops. Under
the 1980 Act, the federal government transitioned the delivery of crop insurance to
private insurance companies and began subsidizing premiums to boost participation.
Despite these innovative reforms, participation rates still remained low during the 1980’s.
In their analysis of U.S. crop insurance participation rates, Gardner and Kramer (1986)
concluded that to obtain a 50% participation rate, insurance had to be subsidized by as
much as 50% due to adverse selection and moral hazard.

3

The data source from current year-to-date national summary of summary reports,
http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html
3

In response to low participation, in 1994 the Congress attempted to link insurance
to other USDA benefits and further increased premium subsidies (Glauber, 2012). As a
result, the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 was enacted and provided coverage
starting at a basic level. Catastrophic risk protection (CAT) was fully subsidized but
required producers to participate in commodity price support. A series of farm programs
followed these developments. Under the incentive of the Reform Act, enrollment in buyup coverage strongly increased during the late 1990s. To further stimulate participation,
Congress later updated the Reform Act to include greater premium subsidies in 1999 and
2000. As shown in figure 1.1, the acres enrolled in the crop insurance program increased
from 182 million areas in 1998 to over 296.2 million in 2013 -- a 62.7% increase in 15
years. Additionally, total liabilities rose to $123.4 billion in 2013 from $44.3 billion
(figure 1.2), almost a tripling in as short as 8 years.
Premium Subsidy in Crop Insurance
Crop insurance is different from many other forms of insurance in that the
government has to entice people with subsidies to buy it. This kind of stimulus is not
required for many other types of low probability high consequence insurance. For
example, Eisner and Strotz (1961) found that people tend to pay far more for flight
insurance than the breakeven cost of the seller. Stimulating such a substantial growth in
crop insurance participation is costly. Each year the federal government subsidizes
farmers, on average, $7 billion from 2011 through 2013 (shown in Figure 1.3). In all,
premium, administrative and operating cost subsidies constitute most of the costs of the
U.S. crop insurance programs. For example in 2008, roughly 60 percent of premiums
(more than $5.5 billion) were paid to insured producers. Additionally, roughly $2 billion
4

in administrative and operating subsidies was paid to the private companies that sell and
service insurance policies.4

Figure 1.3

Premiums, Subsidy and Subsidy Rate in Crop Insurance From 1989 to
20135

It is widely agreed upon in the academic literature that increased participation in
crop insurance program requires an increase in premium subsidies; and without adequate
subsidies, producers are not likely to buy crop insurance (Coble and Barnett, 2012;
Glauber, 2004; Goodwin and Smith, 2012; Glauber, 2012). Goodwin, Coble, and Knight

4

Data source from Risk Management of USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farmpractices-management/risk-management/government-programsrisk.aspx#.UXtRu7WG3YQ
5
Data source from current year-to-date national summary of summary reports,
http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html
5

found that the demand for crop insurance is inelastic at low with respect to premium. In
addition, the marginal costs per acre for enrollment into the program are high relative to
other lines of insurance, which causes a greater level of premium subsidies to achieve
politically acceptable participation rate (Glauber, 2004).
Because crop insurance is subsidized it is insightful to view both the official
actuarial loss ratio which shows how well rate are set and producer loss ratio which offers
a more insightful perspective in terms of producer benefits. The loss ratio, equal to the
indemnity divided by premiums paid by producers, still remains high in the recent decade
(the black line in Figure 1.4). An actuarial fair program would have an average loss ratio
of 1.0. It unveils the problem completely when indemnities are compared to the adjusted
premium (total premium minus premium subsidy): each dollar paid by farmers receives
$2.67 in indemnity repayments in 2013 (the red line in Figure 1.4).
So far as we can see the crop insurance that I have been discussing is nothing but
an “income transfer policy” (pp490, Goodwin and Smith, 2012) The financial burden on
taxpayers also makes it difficult to replicate the insurance program in other countries, not
to mention the market distortion crop insurance may cause (Goodwin and Smith, 2012).
Ultimately one may ask: why does crop insurance need such high subsidies?

6

Figure 1.4

Loss Ratio and Producer Loss Ratio in Crop Insurance from 1989 to 20136

Normative vs Behavioral
Numerous research projects have been motivated by an attempt to explain why
crop insurance requires such significant subsidization. Most of the research concerning
crop insurance demand is based on normative models of choice, such as expected utility
theory and Bayesian updating. But increasing empirical evidence suggests that normative
models cannot explain individual choices adequately (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989).
Also, people tend to exhibit certain biases in the perception of risks. Psychology is being
increasingly applied to economics research as market behaviors cannot be adequately
explained through traditional economic theories. It is suggested that both economic
factors and psychology should be considered when an individual’s insurance purchase is

6

The data source from current year-to-date national summary of summary reports,
http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html
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studied. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) also argued that while normative models are less
identifiable, laboratory experiments and surveys can provide deep insight into individual
decision making process and help design more effective public policies.
Cognitive Errors in Crop Insurance Purchase
Policy makers and researchers have frequently questioned whether there are
cognitive errors made by producers when they are considering participation in crop
insurance programs. Further, could these biases affect the desirability of crop insurance?
Several papers have addressed cognitive bias in other lines of insurance (McClelland et
al., 1993) but none have specifically addressed cognitive bias with crop insurance.
The objective of this research is to evaluate whether cognitive bias is a viable
explanation of why farmers refrain from purchasing crop insurance. To do so, I
conducted a series of experiments designed to identify two plausible cognitive biases in a
simplified setting related to raw crop production, event probability assessment and
perception of loss.

8

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Risk Reference
Sitkin and Weingart (1995) assert that taking actions involving risks is influenced
by both risk perception and risk attitude. Expected Utility theory (EU) is a long asserted
theory of decision making under risk. Daniel Bernoulli (1954) first introduced an EU
hypothesis in 1738 to address the St. Petersburg paradox which argues that expected
values are infinite due to a feature of lack of upper bounds in some probability
distributions. Later, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) formally proposed a theorem
of EU and proved that any individual whose preferences satisfy the four following
axioms has a utility function: completeness, transitivity, continuity, and Archimedean
property. In the theorem, a finite set of n mutually exclusive outcomes ( ai  A ) each
occurs with probability pi . The decision maker observes two (or more) compound lottery
choices X and Y expressed as: X   pi ai and Y   p j ai i  j For a given individual,
there exists such a utility function that satisfies the statement: X

Y , if and only if,

E(u( X ))  E(u(Y )) , where E (u( X )) represents the expected utility :
E (u( p1a1 

 pn an ))  p1u(a1 )  ...  pnu(an ) .

9

Risk preferences are generally divided into three categories: risk averse, risk
neural and risk seeking. However, despite its wide application, expected utility theory is
faced with challenges for example, from prospect theory.
Alternatively, prospect theory provides a more flexible model of risk behavior
than EU (Barberis, 2013). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory in
four components:
(i) Reference dependence - people have reference points to value gains and losses
when evaluating risks.
(ii) Loss aversion - concave in gains and convex in losses; in other words, the
disutility from losing an amount of money is larger than the happiness from
gaining the same amount of money.
(iii) Diminishing sensitivity - people tend to be risk averse over moderate
probability gains but risk seeking over losses.
(iv) Probability weighting - overestimating low probabilities and underestimating
high probabilities.
Over the last few decades, researchers have attempted to apply prospect theory to
economic situations such as insurance. Using insurance purchase data from a large home
insurance company, Sydnor (2010) found that households are willing to pay higher
premiums to purchase a lower deductible policy. This sounds unreasonable but can be
explained by the use of prospect theory. Sydnor (2010) suggested an explanation based
on the probability weighting in prospect theory. A household is inclined to overestimate
the low-probability event under the force of unbalanced probability weighting. Due to
this overwhelming concern about claims in tail events, the household would readily pay a
10

higher premium to prevent from an extreme event. Barseghyan et al. (2012) found
evidence suggesting that probability weighting plays a vital role in individual decisions
when analyzing insurance deductible choices.
There are also some other violations of EU, for example, the violation of
“independence axiom”. This axiom states that the utility and the probability of outcome
are independent and should first be evaluated separately and then multiplied by each
other. Machina (1982) mathematically demonstrated that the results of expected utility
analysis do not necessarily rely on the “independent axiom”, which means that the utility
and the probability have an interactive impact mutually; for example, Camerer (1989)
explains how the independence axiom is inconsistent with some realistic situations where
people may overestimate the probability of winning a lottery because of the positive
utility like a huge amount of unexpected bonus it would bring in while underestimating
the chance of having their houses ruined by an earthquake because of the negative utility
like financial loss it would cause.
Weber and Camerer (1987) relaxed this assumption and presented a modified
model allowing interaction between outcomes and probabilities.
Risk perception and subjective probability
Risk perception
The normative model and alternative theories supplementing the expected utility
theory for risk preference are far from enough to understand how people make decisions
under risky circumstances. Risk perception is another important contributor to influence
individual’s risky decision.

11

The risk in our world is perceived by individual, and thus the degree of risk
perceived of the same event may vary from individual to individual. Risk perception is
the process where people make a risk judgment subjectively. Subjective risk assessment
may provide a deeper understanding of what drives decision making under risk. The
study of risk perception began to boom during the early 1980’s when the public perceived
high risks from nuclear power while experts regarded it as a low-risk issue (DrottzSjöberg, 1991).
Weber (2001) reviewed three approaches to investigate risk perception: the
axiomatic measurement paradigm, the social-cultural paradigm, and the psychometric
paradigm. Axiomatic measurement paradigm focuses on the way people transform the
objective information subjectively to perceive the effect of risks on their daily life.
Within social-cultural paradigm study, the variable of dissimilarity between groups or
cultures on risk perceptions is examined. The psychometric paradigm relates people’s
reactions to risky situations to emotional fluctuation that affect the assessment of
riskiness of practical environment in ways that are in odds with their rational and
objective judgments. Slovic and Peters (2006) refer to risk perception as a feeling or
affection which is our instinctive reactions to danger. They further suggest that risk as a
feeling interpretation is not enough; in other situations affect would lead us to judge
probabilities in inefficient ways. In the other hand, using probability principles to
perceive risks would be beneficial to help decision makers manage and address complex
risks.

12

Subjective Probability
Because individual risk perceptions are subjective, researchers must attempt to
elicit the risk perception from subjects. Subjective probability is the way to measure a
person's belief towards risks or in other words, risk perception, from the perspective of
the personalistic school of probability (Hogarth, 1975). Fishburn (1986) argued that the
theory of subjective probability attempts to connect inherent dispositions towards
uncertainty and quantitative probability. Grisley and Kellogg (1983) provided a more
elaborate definition of subjective probability: a subjective probability is the decision
maker’s beliefs concerning the probability of an uncertain outcome. They further state
that a subjective probability distribution is individualistic and can neither be proven right
or wrong. From a statistical standpoint, each subjective probability is subject to a certain
distribution. If a decision maker's subjective probability distribution can be measured,
then researchers can better understand the manner in which individuals perceive specified
risks.
Few economic studies have focused on eliciting individual subjective probability.
Grisley and Kellogg (1983) conducted a survey in northern Thailand where they
attempted to elicit farmers’ subjective probability towards agricultural decisions such as
crop production and marketing. Their results demonstrated that it is feasible to obtain
farmers’ subjective probability distributions directly for economic indicators, such as
crop yields, prices, and net incomes. They further emphasized that the distributions they
elicited can be thought of as realistic and logical in general. Coble et al. (2011) utilized
elicitation and aggregation techniques to guide participants to acquire accurate subjective

13

estimates of unknown probabilities. Their findings suggested that subjective probability
assessment is feasible to elicit, at least in a laboratory setting.
Bayesian updating
Bayesian updating is another normative model that is extensively used by
economists to examine decisions under uncertainty. This approach posits that people are
able to update their information and change their subjective probability beliefs and its
distribution according to the Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem refers to the relationship
between the individual’s posterior beliefs about the probabilities of events A and B
occurring given, a set of priors. The most common mathematical statement of Bayes Rule
is P( A | B) 

P( B | A) P( A)
. Here, the conditional probability A given B represents the
P( B)

individual’s posterior beliefs derived from the individual’s priors P( A) , P( B) and the
likelihood function P( B | A) .
However, normative models, including Bayesian updating, have difficulty in
adequately explaining the human behavior observed in the real world. Camerer et al.
(2005) criticized Bayesian updating as “unlikely to be correct descriptively” since it is
based on a stack of assumptions that are cognitively unrealistic, such as, a requirement of
a separation between the probabilities of previous-judged events, and no effects of the
order of information received. Gilboa et al. (2008) stated that although Bayesian updating
fails to suggest a feasible model of prior belief formation; it illustrates how these beliefs
are updated according to Bayes’ rule. Furthermore, there have been some experimental
studies in economics and psychology on whether or how people update information
according to Bayes’ rule. Kahneman and Tversky (1971 and 1973) found that people
14

update subjective probability of an uncertain event subject to its parent population, which
is known as representativeness heuristic7. Grether (1980) found experimental evidence to
support the idea that people tend to ignore previous information when a belief is formed,
which is contrary to the Bayesian rule. But Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) determined
that people indeed exhibit Bayesian behaviors and nevertheless tend to overreact beyond
Bayesian updating as a result of showing the hot hand effect or the recency effect.
Biases in Risk Perception and Its Application in Insurance
Decisions making under uncertainty are dependent on the "belief" in the perceived
risks or subjective probability towards risky events. I raise the questions; what determines
an individual's beliefs, and what impacts an individual’s subjective assessments of the
probability of uncertain events? In a famous paper by Tversky and Kahneman (1974),
they asserted that people tend to rely on a few heuristic principles which reduce difficulty
or complexity of assessing probability and therefore simplify the process of predicting
outcomes. A heuristic principle is a rule of thumb, which is generally useful, but
sometimes may lead to systematic decision errors. In their study, Tverskey and
Kahneman described three of heuristics: representativeness, availability, and adjustment
and anchoring. Tversky and Kahneman also provided a plausible explanation--a lack of
appropriate code-- for the failure of people to learn statistical rules in the lifelong
experiences to avoid cognitive biases and detect these biases in their assessments of
probability. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that certain biases in risk

7

By the definition of proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the representativeness heuristic leads
people to judge the probability of an uncertain event, “by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essential
characteristics to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is
generated” (p.430).
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perception or probability assessment are uncovered when these heuristic principles are
employed. That is to say heuristic principles are able to account for some cognitive
biases.
Schkade and Johnson (1989) analyzed results from a series of gamble
experiments to explore bias using methods of both probability and certainty equivalence.
They concluded that subjects adopting heuristic response strategies are more likely to
show significant biases than those using expectation skills. Schwarz and Strack (1991)
point out that Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics could be considered as primary
evidence to end the problem of social psychology in terms of fallacies and errors in
information processing. Gigerenzer (1996) had some different voices stating that most
“errors” in probability judgment are not violations of normative probability models, but
ignorance of conceptual distinctions of the fundamentals of probability theory.
In general, cognitive biases have been a focus of study for many years. In recent
years a variety of new cognitive biases have been identified and increasingly applied in
behavioral economics models. Among them, the “gambler’s fallacy” and “hot hand
effect” have been more frequently studied than other cognitive fallacies.
Gambler's fallacy & hot hand effect
Gambler's Fallacy
Although gambler's fallacy is said to be an elementary and intuitive judgmental
error by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), this fallacy commonly occurs in various
occasions. A body of literature has developed in an attempt to interpret whyhis error is
made. The heart of the gambler's fallacy is a misinterpretation of the fairness of chance
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). The gambler has such a feeling that the fairness of a
16

game, like coin flipping, enables him to expect that any deviation in one direction would
be offset or corrected by a corresponding deviation in the opposite direction in the next
turn, making the overall sequence subject to the underlying probability distribution (in
the “coin flipping” case, the sequence is binomially distributed and people tend to
overestimate the balance of the sequence). However, based on statistical principles, any
two events in this game are statistically independent; in other words, past experience has
nothing to with the odds of occurrence of upcoming events in a random series. This
inability of detecting randomness is known as “the belief in the law of small numbers”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). In statistics, the law of larger numbers tells us that a
large amount of samples would be reliably representative of the population from which
they are drawn. The law of small numbers asserts that the law of larger numbers is also at
work even when the size of sample pool becomes very small.
Clotfelter and Cook (1993) provided evidence that behaviors of lottery players are
consistent with the gambler’s fallacy. Altmann and Burns (2005) conducted an
experiment to examine how different lengths of streaks will bias probability perception.
In their experiment, participants were experiencing a series of heads and tails generated
by a simulated coin with a 75% or 60% chance to be heads. They found a quadratic trend
of prediction of outcomes according to increased streak lengths. At the beginning when a
streak of certain heads (two or three) shows up, subjects exhibited a positive recency
effect; a negative recency trend was discovered just before reverting back to positive
recency in the end. In this study, Altmann and Burns utilized a memory model as an
explanation of the experiment results. Barron and Leider (2010) carried out an interesting
study specifically on how people acquire information to make decision, either by
17

personal experience or abstract description, exerts an effect on outcome predictions in the
future. The results revealed that subjects appeared to employ the Gambler’s fallacy when
experiencing outcomes sequentially; and the Gambler’s fallacy was weakened when
outcomes are revealed to subjects all at once.
Hot Hand
“Hot hand” often reminds us of the times that some of the best basketball players,
like Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant, experienced a “shooting streak” and produced
phenomenal performances in games. The belief in “hot hand” or “streak shooting” is
commonly shared by fans, basketball players, or even coaches. Gilovich et al. (1985)
originated a wave of research of hot hand phenomenon. They used field-goal data from 9
members of the Philadelphia 76ers during 1980-1981 season and free-throw data from 9
players in the Boston Celtics during the 1980-1981 and the 191-1982 seasons and found
that the outcomes of both field goals and free throws are independent of previous
attempts. Later Larkey, Smith, and Kadane (1989) questioned the validity of their
statistical analysis. Tversky and Gilovich (1989) latter defended their opinion by saying
that there is no evidence for hot hand, even in a local (short-lived) phenomenon case: the
overall mean of correlation is just 0.02. Koehler and Conley (2003) examined a unique
setting where 23 shooters in the NBA Long Shootout contests, 1994-1997, were used to
test the hypothesis of the hot hand effect. The results provided no evidence to support the
hot hand even for players who were “on fire”. So they concluded that the belief in the
“hot hand” by basketball players is a description of historical performance rather than a
predictor for future behavior.
18

On the other hand, Gilden and Wilson (1995) found some evidence of the hot
hand in golf and darts or alternatively cold hand, or in their words, “in a streak”. More
specifically, they asserted that a streak is a general property of skilled performance.
Dorsey-Palmateer and Smith (2004) found supportive evidence in bowling using the real
data of 43 plays in Professional Bowlers Association (PBA) during the 2002-2003
season.
Hot hand seems to be a misconception of randomness. Gilovich et al. (1985)
suggested that the hot hand belief might be caused by a memory bias. Streaks are more
memorable than alternations, so the probability of a streak occurring will be
overestimated by observer. Another explanation is that people tend to believe there is a
predictable pattern in a series of random and independent events even when one does not
(Tversky and Gilovich, 1989).
Some researchers have made use of simulations to study hot hand behavior. For
example, Miyoshi (2000) simulated shooting records based on Bernoulli trials where
successful shots were manipulated to follow streaks of hot-hand attempts. The results
indicated that the tests run by Gilovich et al. (1985) are not significantly sensitive to
detect the hot-hand effect (only 12% of hot hand phenomenon was discovered in the test).
Burns (2004) generated a program based on the Markov process. Basketball shooting
success was simulated using several parameters, including a hot hand belief. Only 43 out
of 4752 (48×99) pairs of simulation trials resulted in negative advantage scores.
Therefore, they concluded that relying on the hot hand is an efficient strategy as this
behavior gains more scores.
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Differences between Hot Hand and Gambler’s Fallacy
In many studies, the gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect are discussed together.
These two fallacies both refer to a misconception of chance based on representativeness
(Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, 1985). Rabin (2002) proposed a clear explanation with
respect to representativeness using a well-known “run” experiment to explain how the
two different beliefs relate to a misconception of chance. Some individuals may think of
this urn as a small urn and a streak of balls with one color would sufficiently decrease the
probability of its appearance in the next draw. However, a small urn, as Rabin proposed,
could lead us to the other side as well; a streak of balls with one color in such a small urn
would force people to reconsider the proportion of this color in it. Thus, as more and
more balls with one color show up, the expectation of presence of the same color in the
next time will be increased. Unfortunately, Rabin did not determine a general conclusion
to clarify how these two beliefs of Bayesian updating theories interact. However, this
interpretation is questioned by Ayton and Fischer (2004). They argued that the
representativeness is incomplete, and possibly erroneous to account for the two opposite
reactions to randomness. The experimental results from a simulated roulette wheel game
highlights that subjects simultaneously show both hot hand effect and gambler’s fallacy
respectively for statistically differentiable sequences at the same time. They suggested
that both effects can occur as people come across a misconception of randomness.
Croson and Sundali (2005) made a statement that gambler’s fallacy occurs when a
non-autocorrelated random sequence is perceived as a relationship of negative
autocorrelation, while hot hand effect is a belief that non-autocorrelated random sequence
has a positive autocorrelation. These definitions of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand
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provide a statistical perspective that can also be found in other related literature. Croson
and Sundali (2005) attempted to identify these two biases separately within a given
individual player in a field experiment (roulette games in casino), in order to identify the
interaction between them. They concluded that a “significant and positive” correlation
between gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect within individuals who behave in
consistence with both fallacious beliefs. A shared cause for the two cognitive biases
however, was not discovered in their study.
Other than the statistical distinction between two fallacies, some other subtle but
important differences are found. In Burns and Corpus’ study (2004), experimental results
demonstrated that when events are perceived to be nonrandom, going with streaks should
bring in better outcomes than against streaks; in other words, people tend to believe in a
“hand hot” when they believe the sequence of outcomes is nonrandom since this is a
dominant strategy compared to when events are judged to be random. However, their
experimental results also support that randomness of an event may exert a positive effect
on people’s utilization of the gambler’s fallacy. Nickerson (2002) reported similar results.
Moreover, hot hand believers also believe that “hot” applies only to a particular person,
and not for a particular outcome (Croson and Sundali, 2005). Ayton and Fischer (2004)
utilized computer software to simulate the actions of a hypothetical but schematic roulette
wheel, and recorded subject responses and level of confidence in probability judgment
and argued that subjects believe that an individual can become “hot”, but an inanimate
device cannot. , In the last game of general discussion, Ayton and Fischer tried some
other explanations of these two phenomena. Representativeness could account for both
cognitive biases effectively, though not complete; Life experiences—negative or positive
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recent experience in daily life—could also be a cause of both erroneous belief In
addition, this article concluded that people indeed exhibit a fallible belief of hot hand or
gambler’s fallacy in terms of the randomness concept and suggested that people would
use a means of encoding to reduce the difficulty of identifying the randomness of a series.
A simple conclusion can be drawn that an individuals’ understanding of
randomness of a sequence of successive events plays a vital role in generating their
beliefs about these two fallacies.
Application of cognitive biases in insurance study
The decision making process of insurance purchase, where consumers are seen as
judging probability for risks, offers a potentially interesting environment where cognitive
biases can occur. However, few research studies have addressed the issues specifically
concerning the interaction between cognitive heuristics or bias and insurance purchase
behavior. Existing research has revealed some interesting findings and also led to further
study of cognitive bias in the context of decision-making in crop insurance purchase.
Kunreuther et al. (1978) showed that flood insurance is not popular in hazardprone areas even when it is highly subsidized or its price is driven far below the
actuarially fair value. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) utilized a double-oral auction
experiment to investigate the effect of past losses on the impending behavior by setting
up the hypothesis of gambler’s fallacy. The authors, however, found no strong support for
the theory from their regression results. Johnson et al. (1993) made a summary after
reviewing several surveys and studies regarding insurance decisions that consumers'
insurance decisions is affected by the perceived risk, and these decisions are inconsistent
with basic principles of probability. McClelland et al. (1993) constructed an experiment
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where a Vickrey auction was used to investigate insurance purchase behavior in the
presence of low-probability risk. The results in the experiments reveal that people tend to
employ either one of the two opposite strategies when confronted with low-probability
hazards: ignoring it or worrying too much about it. Neither Johnson et al or McClelland
et al. however, provided further explanations for these distorted perceptions of risks
during the insurance decision making process. Experimental results in Shapira and
Venezia’s research (2008) indicated that anchoring heuristic principles is an explanation
for this misperception of risks in insurance buying. The people tend to anchor on the size
of the deductible but fail to adjust price upward effectively to consider the fact that they
just own a little chance to claim the deductible, which distort the judgment in their
payments. Galarza and Carter (2010) found evidence of the "hot-hand"8 effect in their
analysis that insurance buyers tend to underestimate the autocorrelation of the sequence
of "bad" years. In Galarza and Carter’s study on the full-coverage insurance policy, it is
found that amateur subjects are prone to underestimate the value of a deductible policy.
Research on Crop Insurance Demand
In the United States, the federal government started to provide farmers with risk
management programs in the 1930’s. In the last decades, several changes in insurance
legislation have resulted in the steady growth in federal crop insurance participation.
Goodwin (1993) established an empirical model to investigate factors which
affect the demand for insurance by using county data in Ohio. The results suggested that

8

Given the description of the “hot-hand” effect in their article, the phenomenon of this
“hot hand” is essentially consistent with gambler’s fallacy which is in accordance with
foresaid definitions of hot hand and gambler’s fallacy.
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raising premium rates might aggravate the severity of adverse selection9 problems and
greatly increase the possibility of inflating the industry loss ratio since low loss-risks
enjoy a significantly more elastic demand than high loss-risks. Smith and Baquet (1996)
modelled Montana wheat farmers’ participation decisions and coverage-level selections
separately and found that increases in premium rates do not exert an apparent effect on
participation but materially depress the coverage level. Another comment based on the
results is that increasing overall premium rates inefficiently reduce the loss ratios as
adverse selection would limit its efficacy, just like what Goodwin (1993) suggested
above. Coble et al. (1996) empirically made use of farm-level panel data to identify what
effects certain variables, especially the variance of return in insurance, have on insurance
demand. Their estimation results indicated that growers who are willing to receive
frequent indemnities with smaller coverage are expected to more readily be insured than
those who like indemnities that are rare but large. Serra et al. (2003) conducted research
on changes in demand for crop insurance during the 1990’s. A basket of variables,
including chemical input use, wealth of farms, and expected net income per acre, were
put in the right-hand side of the regression model to explain the insurance demand.
Focusing on the demand elasticity they conclude that the crop insurance purchase
decision represents an inelastic response to premium rates changes. Sherrick (2004)
carried out a mail survey of Midwestern U.S. farmers and analyze personal, business and
other factors influencing crop insurance purchase decisions. The results revealed that
farmers who are more highly leveraged, less wealthy, and operate larger farms with

9

The adverse selection refers to a phenomenon that individuals with larger risk of loss tend to buy more
insurance. In the case of crop insurance, farmers with larger risk of loss are willing to buy insurance so as
to insurance companies potentially undertake more financial risks.
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higher perceived risks show a higher likelihood of crop insurance purchase and are more
willing to run business under revenue protection versus yield protection. Shaik et al.
(2008) conducted a survey in four states on four main crops: corn, soybeans, cotton and
grain sorghum to study the decision whether to purchase yield or revenue crop insurance.
The elasticity of yield insurance demand estimated in this study is -0.40, consistent with
the estimates in prior literature and the elasticity for revenue demand insurance is
estimated to be slightly higher (-0.88). Their results also showed that farmers who have a
high expectation of yields or revenues are less likely to purchase insurance products.
These articles mentioned here, despite diversities in their explanatory variables,
all analyze the insurance demand in terms of objective properties, like farmland size,
farmer’s initial wealth and premium rate across insurance programs. None of the studies,
however, attempts to explain the demand from an individual insurance buyer’s
perspective: a subjective preference and perception towards risks of crop insurance
purchase.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTURAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptual Model
Participation in a crop insurance program could be viewed as a dichotomous
choice, whether to be insured or uninsured. Under this view the alternative coverage
levels are disregarded. It is assumed that farmers are expected utility maximizers. An
individual farmer will choose by comparing the expected utility with insurance, EU Ii to
the expected utility without insurance EU Ni . Since farmers’ risk preferences and
perceptions are difficult to be measured directly, certain observable factors influencing
the distribution and the evaluation of expected utility are used to address the choice
problem. The model of crop insurance participation put forward by Coble et al. (1996) is
used. The expected utility of being insured EU Ii or not being insured EU Ni could be
written as functions of a vector of factors,

(3.1)
(3.2)
where β N is a vector of estimated impacts from the influencing factors for farmers that
do not purchase insurance, β I is a vector of estimated impacts from influencing factors
for farmers that purchase insurance, x i is a vector of influencing factors on individual i .
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The expected utility difference between the two choices, insured and uninsured, could be
expressed as,

(3.3)

where λ  (β I   β N  ) . A rational individual decides to purchase insurance if

EU Ii  EU Ni  0 ; otherwise no purchase is made.
A further examination of insurance purchase decision is needed to determine
variables in x i vector. The expected utility for the insured and uninsured situations can be
written as follows,

(3.4)
And

(3.5)
where MR( ) stands for market return, I ( ) is an indemnity function,  is the premium,
A is planted acres, W0 represents initial wealth, and g ( ) is a probability density function

of  , a random state of nature, and note that  * means the state of nature which results in
a guaranteed level of yield. Market return is equal to market price times yield, minus cost.
Here market return and indemnity are both functions of  .
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Based on equations (4) and (5), Coble et al. (1996) constructed an optimal
participation choice model for a risk-averse person where the choice variable is a
function of parameters including wealth, moments of the random variables MR( ) and
I ( ) , and individual’s risk preference:

(3.6)
where i ( MR) and i ( RI ) are respectively the moments of individual i ’s market return
distribution and return to insurance ( RI  I ( )   ); r is the risk-aversion coefficient,
determined by Arrow-Pratt absolute risk-aversion function.
Optimal risk-taking behavior relies on both risk preference and risk perception.
The individual risk preference is measured by risk aversion coefficient r and initial
wealth W0 10. The individual risk perception of risk, especially of crop revenue in my
experiment, is determined by subjective probability of random revenue. When we
examine individual purchase choice, a farmer would formulate their own subjective
distribution of revenue to predict the risks of revenue of loss. In equation (6) i ( MR) , the
moments of market return11 or revenue, are the influencing variables. Therefore, the
subjective moments of revenue, mean Rev and standard deviation  Rev , are used to
explain the consumer behavior in crop insurance purchase in my case as well. In the
experiment, a subjective probability of revenue loss prob accounting for the moments of
revenue was recorded from subjects and included into the regression function.

10

The initial wealth are assumed the same across individuals in my experiment, so it is not regarded as a
factor variable in the conceptual model.
11
Market return of crop, expressed as crop yield times crop price, is an equivalent to crop revenue
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Equation (6) is foundation of this research. As discussed above, prob is the key
factor variable in my conceptual model. Therefore, a model allowing for behavioral
anomalies which are reflected in the variances of subjective probability distribution of
revenue is formulated
(3.7)
Where purchase choice C is binary category, buying or not buying. The purchase
choice is a function of risk preference12, probability of loss prob and cognitive bias
factors streaks . prob is the subjective probability of loss or revenue risks which is an
equivalent of i ( MR) in equation (3.6). streaks is created to account for the effect of
cognitive bias on purchase choice.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis One: Hot (Cold) Hand Effect.
If the revenues have been above the indemnity level over recent years, farmers are
less likely to purchase insurance in the next year based on their belief of “hot hand”.
Conversely, if the revenues have been already standing below the indemnity level for
years, farmers are more likely to purchase insurance in the next year based on the belief
of “cold hand”.
Since the revenue is on a good streak, farmers would prefer to think that the
revenue outcomes have a “hot hand” and they expect a good harvest in the next year.

12

Theoretically individual risk preference is the influencing factor of purchase choice. But it is not included
into the independent variables of the regression empirically since the regression was ran individually and
risk preference keeps constant within individual.
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Importantly, this reflects a perceived positive autocorrelation of revenues when in fact
there is none or a higher positive autocorrelation in case of low positive autocorrelation.
A “hot hand” effect occurs when people’s subjective probability for satisfactory revenue
in next year is increased because of their consideration of a series of successive years of
satisfactory revenue in a short term as a trend which is believed to maintain in the next
year. However, in fact this is simply an occasion of well-ordered randomness. If the
revenue is on a bad streak, on the other hand, an expectation of positive autocorrelation
would lead farmers to increase the probability of loss in the next year and tend to buy
more insurance.
Hypothesis Two: Gambler’s Fallacy
If the revenues have been below the indemnity level consecutively in recent years,
farmers are less likely to buy insurance in the next year. Or on the other side, farmers are
more likely to buy insurance in the next year if the revenues have been above the
indemnity level for several years.
Since the past years’ revenues have been below farmers’ expectations, they have a
tendency to believe that they cannot be so unlucky that a bad outcome will occur in the
subsequent year. Conversely, if they have been experiencing a streak of years with good
revenues, they would suppose that good luck is running out and bad revenue is probably
around the corner.
Data Analysis
Both descriptive statistics and regression analysis were employed in this study.
Descriptive statistics such as means, frequencies, line chart and bar chart show a general
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description of subjects’ performance in the experiment such as their understanding of
histogram and autocorrelation, their perception on potential revenue risk and their
willingness to purchase insurance. A binary logit regression analysis was used to examine
the subjective probability and cognitive bias that influence subjects’ decisions to engage
in insurance protection.
Binary logistic model
In many cases, the researchers generate models where the dependent variable is
categorical. In my study, the insurance purchase decision is a well-explained example
which only involves two choices, buy it or not. The estimation method of Ordinary Least
Square fails to provide reliable estimates in a regression with a binary dependent variable.
Therefore, logistic regression could be considered as a feasible approach which takes into
consideration that the dependent variable is categorical.
The basic model of the logit regression is expressed as follow:

(3.8)
Similarly,
(3.9)

Dividing (1) by (2),

(3.10)
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Where Pi is the probability that Ci takes the value of 1 and 1  Pi is the probability that Ci
takes the value of 0. X ki is the influencing factor and e is the exponential constant.
In my study the dependent variable is to buy insurance or not, taking value either
1 meaning willing to buy or 0 meaning unwilling to buy. As shown in (3.7), the
influencing factors in the insurance demand regression include subjective probability and
streak factors:

(3.11)

where  i is an error term subject to a normal distribution.
Experimental Economics
As discussed above, many researchers, like Clotfelter and Cook (1993), Ayton
and Fischer (2004), and Burns and Corpus (2004), made use of real gambles to design
experiments for pure cognitive research in psychology. Some researchers, based on the
needs in their study field, tended to construct specified contexts in experiments to explore
how cognitive thinking affect their decision making in the real world, like Camerer and
Kunreuther (1989), Mcclelland et al. (1993). In terms of the goal in this research, the
effect of certain cognitive biases on crop insurance purchase was to be investigated. In
our experiment I created a crop insurance market where an actuarially fair priced
insurance was offered to protect from revenue risks and subjects’ willingness to pay for
the insurance was elicited.
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Lab experiments have been gaining increasing popularity among economists in
recent decades and hundreds of articles based upon experimental methods were published
each year (Levitt and List, 2007). Why would researchers like to make use of
experimental methods to study research topics? In lab experiments, investigators can be
able to influence the sets including prices, budgets and environment, and measure the
effect of every single factor on behavior under the laboratory experimental context with
the help of ceteris paribus observations of individual agents in the experiment (Levitt and
List, 2007). It is difficult, for example, to observe individual’s house insurance purchase
behavior over many years and further to examine the effects of a catastrophe occurred in
this year on the next year’s insurance participation. However, it is comparatively easy to
offer participants in the lab experiment exposures to risky situation in continuous periods
and obtain their behavioral observations.
On the other hand, laboratory experiments have their shortcomings. One common
criticism on laboratory methodology is that participants cannot adequately take a part in
the experiment where the context is not sufficiently realistic, especially in terms of the
effects of financial incentives on experiment (McClelland et al. 1993). For instance, the
monetary gains and losses in the laboratory are trivial compared to, for instance, the real
potential losses living in flood-prone area when investigating flood insurance purchase
behavior. Nevertheless, there are some observations in the laboratory indicating that
small monetary flows are capable of eliciting their true evaluation of risky events.
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) discussed the effects of financial incentives depend on what
the task is; in some tasks incentives increase performance but in many tasks incentives do
not matter. They further stated that the scope of financial incentives does not change
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subjects’ behaviors in a substantive way. Dickhaut et al. (2013) reported evidence that
one can use low stakes experiments to produce choices that well-reflect decisions made
in that same environment where stakes are much higher.
Other than the concerns about the effect of the scale of monetary incentives on
experimental results, a found-money effect also distorts the outcomes of experiments
(Laury and Holt, 2008). In Laury and Holt’s experiment, to mitigate the found-money
effect and make the loss more real to subjects, the participants were allowed to earn their
initial endowments before they faced the risk task. Morone and Ozdemir (2006)
employed the same strategy in their study in an effort to eliminate the effect of foundmoney.
A strong attribute of laboratory experiment is that an experiment conducted in a
lab offers participants a relative calm environment and repeated experience with a single
specified risk. This valuable idea is put forward by McClelland et al. (1993) and they
explain that if subjects do not have the cognitive capability to deal with risk problems, we
are unlikely to exclude the possibility that they will struggle cognitively to make a
decision whether to worry about a risky event like a hazardous facility in their
neighborhood under a more highly emotional circumstance. Even though laboratory
experiments have advantages and disadvantages that we should take into consideration, in
the final analysis, the only one core and fundamental question we are concerned with is
whether the findings from the lab are reliable enough to be generalized into the real world
and provide credible justifications outside of the laboratory. Numerous studies suggested
that if various dimensions in laboratory experiments are manageable, the generalizability
of lab data can be also attained (Levitt and List, 2007).
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (14-048) for
research of human subjects at Mississippi State University (see Appendix A). Our
subjects were junior or senior undergraduate students and graduate students recruited
from agricultural economics, business and science classes at Mississippi State University.
The experiment is Excel (Microsoft) based. All possible choices were recorded on
the spreadsheets. After all decisions in all the rounds were made, the final score and
accompanying payment were displayed at the top of the spreadsheet. At this time subjects
also receive payments from the experimenters. Subjects were told that individual
outcomes are independent of choices made by others. Each participant receives a
payment for attending the experiment, regardless of participation level.
In this experiment, respondents participated in two consecutive games. To reduce
the possibility of an anchoring effect, the order of the two games was changed each
session. A total of 9 sessions were conducted and 96 subjects took part in this experiment.
Each session began with an introductory talk (see Appendix A). The experimental
introductions were read aloud and explained in detail. After the introduction, each
individual completes a form of a Holt-Laury lottery choice task ((Holt and Laury, 2002)
and then began the game.
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Holt-Laury Lottery Choice Task
In Holt-Laury lottery choice task, subjects made 10 choices between option A and
Option B and were to be paid one of the two amounts. In each question, Option A has a
smaller variation and is considered “safe”, while Option B with a larger variation is
considered “risky”. Each question differs in the probability of winning bigger rewards. A
more detailed summary of the two options can be found at Table 4.1. Finally a real 10sided die was thrown twice: the first throw determines which question would be used for
the second throw and then the second throw decides which prize is to be paid. In question
1, for example, the higher prize is paid if the throw of die is 1 and the lower prize is paid
when any other throw appears. For question 2, the higher prize is paid when the throw is
1 or 2 while the lower prize is paid for 3 through 10. The point at which subjects shift
from "safe" to "risky" in lottery can be used to elicit their range of risk aversion. (For
more detailed experiment instructions, see Appendix A)
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Table 4.1

Risk Preference Decision Sheet

Question

Option A

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

10% chance of $10.00,
90% chance of $8.00
20% chance of $10.00,
80% chance of $8.00
30% chance of $10.00,
70% chance of $8.00
40% chance of $10.00,
60% chance of $8.00
50% chance of $10.00,
50% chance of $8.00
60% chance of $10.00,
40% chance of $8.00
70% chance of $10.00,
30% chance of $8.00
80% chance of $10.00,
20% chance of $8.00
90% chance of $10.00,
10% chance of $8.00
100% chance of $10.00,
0% chance of $8.00

Option B

Which Option
Is preferred?

10% chance of $19.00
90% chance of $1.00
20% chance of $19.00
80% chance of $1.00
30% chance of $19.00,
70% chance of 1.00
40% chance of $19.00,
60% chance of $1.00
50% chance of $19.00,
50% chance of $1.00
60% chance of $19.00,
40% chance of $1.00
70% chance of $19.00,
30% chance of $1.00
80% chance of $19.00,
20% chance of $1.00
90% chance of $19.00,
10% chance of $1.00
100% chance of $19.00,
0% chance of $1.00

Table 4.2 shows expected payoff corresponding to each option of each question.
These values are not shown to subjects.
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Table 4.2

Expected Payoff
Expected payoff difference

Question

Option A

Option B

1

$8.20

$2.80

$5.40

2

$8.40

$4.60

$3.80

3

$8.60

$6.40

$2.20

4

$8.80

$8.20

$0.60

5

$9.00

$10.00

-$1.00

6

$9.20

$11.80

-$2.60

7

$9.40

$13.60

-$4.20

8

$9.60

$15.40

-$5.80

9

$9.80

$17.20

-$7.40

10

$10.00

$19.00

-$9.00

Two different experimental methods were used in two separate games. The first
game is a dichotomous choice task, and the second one is a modified experiment adapted
from a paper by Offerman and Sonnemans (2004).
Game One: Dichotomous Choice Task
In this task, each subject played a role of a farmer growing a crop. Like most crop
farmers, subjects cannot control either weather, which has an effect on the yield, or the
market price. The cost of planting crops was $90 per acre and the expected revenue was
$100 per acre. Each farmer grew 100 acres as a total. Therefore, they were expected to
earn $1000 in one harvest year.
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To help subjects understand the revenue risks of crop production, they were
presented with a histogram of 1000 observations (figure 4.113) from the true distribution
of revenue outcomes and were informed that the underlying distribution remains constant
throughout the game. The outcome is distributed normally with a mean of 100 and a
standard deviation of 20, but this piece of information was not revealed to subjects.

Figure 4.1

The histogram of 1000 revenue observations presented to subjects in Game
One

A crop insurance contract allowed subjects to avoid revenue loss. The coverage
level was $90/acre; if the revenue fell below $90/acre in a year, the insurance would
make up the gap between 90 and actual revenue with an indemnity when farms already
held the insurance policy. The premium in this game, an unsubsidized actuarially fair

13

The horizontal axis shows the revenue ranges; the vertical axis shows the percentages.
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premium rate, was based on the 1000 revenue observations previously observed. The
premium is $4/acre, calculated as follow,

premium 

1 1000
 (90  revenuen ) , only if revenuen  90
1000 n 1

(4.1)

Subjects began this game by answering a probability question,
“What is the probability of collecting insurance (the probability that revenue falls
below $90 per acre) do you think it would be in the next year”
and then need to answer a purchase choice question
“Whether or not are you willing to buy the insurance?”
Subject could make use of original prior information (the revenue histogram), and
updated their prior information (drawn revenue observations in each period) and
perceptions of losses and then maximize their expected profits through buying insurance
given an actuarially fair price. Then at the end of each period, an observation of revenue
was randomly selected from the distribution and the insurance would cover the losses of
those who held the contract if the actual revenue was below the deductible level ($90 per
acre). A total of 50 rounds of choices were observed for each of the subjects. Each 1000
tokens earned in the experiment would be exchanged with one dollar in real cash.
In both games, the payoff function for each individual can be expressed as follow,

 A[rt   (c)]
payoff  
 A{rt   t [(r  rt )  c)}

if rt  r
if rt  r

(4.2)

where is A the fixed plant acres; rt is the random crop revenue in period t ; c is the cost of
holding an insurance contract (in this game, c is a pre-specified price as premium rate);
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r is the deductible level of revenue.  t is a binary choice variable in period t ; 1 denotes
holding an insurance policy and 0 means not.
Game Two: Modified Offerman & Sonnemans’ Experiment Task
In Game Two, I used Offerman and Sonnemans’ (2004) methodology in the crop
insurance experiment. (For more detailed experiment instruction, see Appendix A)
In this task, each subject still played a role of farmer and made a dichotomous
choice to buy insurance contracts in each period. Every subject was growing 100 acres of
the crop with a cost of $90 per acre and expected revenue of $100 per acre. If yields or
market prices were low enough subjects would lose money. Likewise, an insurance
policy with a coverage level of $90 was provided to protect them from potential losses
caused by low revenues.
What differs from the first dichotomous choice task is that, in each period subjects
were shown different series of 21 observations that were either correlated or independent
with a 50%-50% chance (but the subjects were not told whether the series of randomly
selected revenues are independent or correlated). That is, if revenues were independent or
uncorrelated across time, then the revenue for this year would have no relationship with
next year’s revenue. However, if revenues were correlated then if this year’s revenue
was above average there is a 70% chance next year’s revenue would be above average.
Conversely, if this year’s revenue was below average there would be a 70% chance next
year’s revenue would be below average. The next is how the uncorrelated and especially
correlated revenue series were generated.
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Revenue data generation
There are two types of revenues in this game; one is from normal distribution with
a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20 (game one) and the other is transformed
from this normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation but with autocorrelation across periods. Based on the instruction (see Appendix A) “the next
observation of revenue has a chance of 0.7 to be above the previous one”, we used a
process called “first-order autoregressive process”, denoted as AR1 in time series
(Gujarati, 1995).
A first-order autoregression (AR1) could be expressed as the following difference
equation,

(4.3)
where {  t } is a white noise sequence satisfying the following three conditions: E ( t )  0 ,

E ( t2 )   2 and E ( t )  0 for t   . In our case, it is assumed that  t is normally
distributed with a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of  2 . Yt
is the crop revenue in period t and Yt 1 denotes the crop revenue in period t  1 .  , which
is according to our experimental setting, is 0.3 which is less than 1, so that Yt can be
considered as a covariance-stationary process. Based on the properties of difference
equation, equation (4.2) can be transformed as

(4.4)
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Taking expectations of (4.4), we can see that

E (Yt )  [c/(1- )]  0  0  

(4.5)

So we can say that the mean of a stationary AR(1) process is

 AR  c / (1   )

(4.6)

The variance is

 0  E (Yt   ) 2
=E( t   t 1   2 t  2   3 t 3  )2
=(1+ 2   4   6  ) 2
= 2 / (1   2 )

(4.7)

Since this stationary AR(1) process is based on the normal distribution with

 N  100 and  N  20 , in our case, the revenue series with correlation and that without
correlation share the same values of mean and standard deviation. In other words,

N   AR  100
and

(4.8)

 N2   0  202

(4.9)

By substituting (4.8) into equation (4.6), the value of c is equal to 30. Substitute
(4.8) into (4.6),  is 20 5.1 ,

Yt  30  0.7Yt 1  20 .51  et

, where

et

(0, 1)

(4.10)

Hence, 50 different series of 21 observations with correlation were generated one
by one, according to equation (4.10).
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The 21 observations would be shown in a form of “20-1”. At first, the computer
drew a series of twenty years of crop revenues (“20”) from whatever the revenues were,
either independent or correlated, for subjects to observe. (Figure 4.2) The decision
makers observed the revenue series and then needed to answer the following two
probability questions
“What is the chance that this crop’s revenue is correlated across time?”
“Given the series you are observing, what is the chance that you will collect an
indemnity if you purchase the insurance policy?”
and then decided whether to buy the insurance contract. At last the year’s actual revenue
from the series was shown after subjects had answered those three questions.

Figure 4.2

The example of a line chart of randomly drawn 20 observations in Game
Two
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Quadratic scoring rule
The second source of earning from this game was based on each subject’s
estimate of the probability that revenues were correlated across time. The payoff was
determined by the quadratic scoring rule. The quadratic scoring rule works in this manner.
Assuming that S is the participant’s reported probability that outcomes are correlated, the
payoff is 10,000  S 2 points if revenues are uncorrelated across time and is 200*S  S

2

points if correlated.
As an incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit beliefs, the quadratic scoring rule
incentivizes subjects to truthfully reveal their subjective probability (Sonnemans and
Offerman, 2001). Clements and Harvey (2010) also used the quadratic scoring rule for
probability forecasts. Vanberg (2008) used this rule to investigate the effect of exchange
of promises on cooperative behavior in experimental games. In this experiment, subjects
were provided with a payoff table based on the formulas above, but the math formulas
were not shown to the subjects. The table displayed each payoff corresponding to
probabilities in the interval from 0% to 100% both when revenues are correlated and
when revenues are uncorrelated. Under this scoring rule, the best strategy for subjects is
to report beliefs truthfully.
The payoff table (table 4.3) shows how many points the subjects would obtain
based on the reported probability if the revenues are “correlated’ or “uncorrelated”. At
the end of experiment, the earned points were exchanged for dollars (the exchange rate is
8,000 points = one dollar and subjects were instructed with the exchange rate in advance).
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Finally, subjects earned the revenues from harvesting the crop. The average
revenue per acre is $100 but it costs $90 to grow. The payoff function in this game is
shown above as equation (4.1).
Table 4.3

Payoff table of quadratic scoring rule
Points

Reported
Probability
(%)
Correlated

1
0

0

10

900

Uncorrelate
d

10000 900

20

2
30

3

4

40

50

5
60

6
70

7
80

8

9

90

100

1

3

5

6

7

8

9

9

600

100

400

500

400

100

600

900 10000

9

9

9

8

7

6

5

3

600

100

400

500

400

100

600

900
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS

Experiment Results
In total 96 subjects participated in this experiment. 92 valid samples in Game One
and 95 valid samples in Game Two were collected for analysis14.
General description of risk preference
At the beginning of the experiment, I collected the risk preference data of each
individual, by the use of Holt-Laury Lottery Choice task (see more in Appendix A). A
total number of 96 samples were obtained and the number of Option A selections was
calculated individually. Table 5.3 displays the relative risk aversion coefficient as an
indicator of individual’s risk preference (Holt and Laury, 2002). When looking at the
lottery choices, I found that some of them failed to understand the instruction well so as
to behave in an irrational way of switching choices from option A to option B and then
back to A at least once. A value of 99 was assigned to those irrational choices. Therefore
a distribution of risk preference across individuals was given in Figure 5.6. There are 18
subjects who were given a 99 risk preference indicating these subjects exhibited irrational

14

There are 96 subjects participating in this experiment. A subject who was found cheated in the
experiment was dropped out from the valid samples. As I mentioned, the order of two games were
switched in each section. There are 3 subjects who only finished Game Two and then left without
completion of the whole experiment. 92 samples in Game One were collected.
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behaviors somehow. Most of the subjects’ numbers of Option A are ranging from 4 to 6.
Combined with Table 5.3, it implies that most subjects in the sample show a risk neural,
mildly risk averse or risk averse attitude towards risk. The most common response was to
switch with the 6th choice which is defined as risk averse.
Table 5.1

Risk Aversion Coefficient

Number of
safe choices

a

Range of relative risk
aversion for U (W ) 

W 1r
1 r

Middle point of

Risk preference

relative risk aversion

classification

0-1

-1.76a < rr < -0.93

-1.365

Highly risk loving

2

-0.97 < rr < -0.49

-0.73

Very risk loving

3

-0.49 < rr <-0.13

-0.31

Risk loving

4

-0.13 < rr < 0.19

0.03

Risk neutral

5

0.19 < rr < 0.48

0.335

Slightly risk averse

6

0.48< rr < 0.78

0.63

Risk averse

7

0.78< rr < 1.13

0.955

Very risk averse

8

1.13< rr < 1.60

1.365

Highly risk averse

9-10

1.60< rr < 2.2 a

1.9

Stay in bed

these two lower and upper bound are subjectively determined
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Figure 5.1

The distribution of risk preference across individuals

General description of reported probability
In Game One, subjects needed to answer the question in each period that “what do
you think the probability of collecting insurance (the probability that revenue falls below
$90 per acre) it would be next year”. The probability distribution shown to subjects
throughout Game One shows that 33% is the correct probability that the revenue would
fall below $90 per acre (Figure 5.1). To measure their understanding of histogram and
assessment of probability in Game One, a scoring rule (equation 5.1) were calculated for
each subject. The density distribution is given below (Figure 5.2). The formula of this
scoring rule is expressed as

(5.1)
where piit is reported probability. Therefore, the lower score the subjects gained the
better understanding of histogram they have. The distribution of the calculated scores
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across individuals is plotted in figure 5.2. There is one subject who reported 33%
probability across all rounds and another three subjects reported the same probability
below 40% in all rounds which implies that these subjects had a clear understanding of
this histogram. Among them 21 subjects (over one firth of samples) gained a score larger
than 219 meaning that the positive or negative deviations from 33% of their reported
probability are on average more than 30 percentage points in each period. So apparently
they did not understand the histogram or the revenue risks adequately. The table 5.2
shows the average reported probability of loss across individuals is 46.61, which means
that the subjects overestimated the revenue loss risks.

Figure 5.2

The histogram shown to subjects in Game One
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Figure 5.3

The distribution of score across individuals in Game One

In Game Two, we already have the quadratic scoring rule to measure their
evaluation of probability of correlation. In each round, subjects gained a score and then
the scores in all 50 rounds were averaged:

(5.2)
where qsrit is the point subjects obtained through the quadratic scoring rule based on the
reported probability of the revenue series being correlated. The higher qsrt is, the better
their assessment of correlation probability is. In Figure 5.3, the distribution of scores
across individuals in Game Two is negatively skewed, which shows that more of them
had a relatively good accuracy of probability of the revenue series being correlated.
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Table 5.2

Summary Statistics of Scores and Probability

Variable
Reported probability
of loss in Game One
Reported probability
of loss in Game Two
Score in Game One
Score in Game Two

Figure 5.4

Sample Mean
(s.d.)

Min

Max

# of obs

46.61(22.40)

0

100

4600

46.12(23.29)

0

100

4750

162.16(90.20)
69.42(4.52)

0
53.17

382.00
76.51

92
95

The distribution of score across individuals in Game Two

Let us look at their performance of the subjects’ assessment of correlation in
another perspective. The reported correlation probability larger than 50% is labeled as
“perceived correlation” while probability less than 50% is “perceived correlation”
(probability equal to 50% were deleted due to subjects’ uncertainty in perception). 4048
observations were used to design the Table 5.2 where the percentages that the perceived
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correlation was right or wrong conditional on that the series was in fact correlated or
uncorrelated are displayed. Some interesting relationships are found as follows,
1. Subjects generally did a good job, with more correct answers (61.07%) than
wrong answers (38.93%). The percentages of perceived correlation and nocorrelation are 44.07% and 55.93% respectively, close to the true percentages of
correlation and no-correlation.
2. The fact that the perceived percentage of no-correlation (55.93%) is larger than
that of correlation (44.07%) indicates that subjects were not likely to overestimate
the probability of correlation but underestimate it although the instruction says
that there is a 50-50 chance to be either correlated or uncorrelated.
3. Furthermore, the percentage that subjects’ perception of correlation when revenue
data was uncorrelated is the lowest one (17.39%) among those four percentages,
which confirms the foresaid argument: subjects were not inclined to overestimate
the correlation probability.
4. The accuracy of probability perception is 55.3% when the series is correlated
while accuracy is 66.4% when it is uncorrelated, which indicates that subjects are
better at identifying uncorrelated series than correlated series.
Table 5.3

perceived

Subjects’ correlation perceptions compared to true correlation

correlation
no-correlation
total

True
correlation
no-correlation
26.68%
17.39%
21.54%
34.39%
48.22%
51.78%
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total
44.07%
55.93%
100%

General description of purchase choices
As shown in table 5.2, subjects purchased the insurance contract on average
27.536 periods in 50 periods in Game One. The min and max are 0 and 50. In Game Two
subjects bought insurance in average 26.80 rounds out of 50 rounds. The min and max
are 2 and 50. Note that 2 subjects bought no insurance in 50 periods but 2 bought it in
every round of Game One; while no subjects completed 50 rounds without purchasing
insurance in Game Two and 2 subjects purchased insurance in every round. From the
results of normality in table 5.5, the Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the distribution
purchase choice in Game Two is normally distributed while Game One is not and
negatively skewed.
Table 5.4

Summary Statistics of Purchase Choices

Variable
The Count of
Purchase Periods for
individuals in Game1
The Count of
Purchase Periods for
individuals in Game2

Sample Mean
(s.d.)

Min

Max

# of obs

27.536(13.144)

0

50

92

26.80(11.074)

2

50

95
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Table 5.5

Normality test for the purchase choices across individuals in both games
Game One

Game Two

Test

Statistics

P Value

Statistics

P Value

Shapiro-Wilk

0.961768

0.0085

0.98407

0.3044

Figure 5.5

The distribution of count of purchase choices across individuals in Game
One
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Figure 5.6

The distribution of count of purchase choices across individuals in Game
Two

Based on the record of the number of purchase choices across individuals in both
games, it is interesting to examine whether there is a distinctive difference of buying
behavior between two games. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum and t-test are used to
address this issue (Table 5.5). Since Game Two has 3 more samples than Game One,
those samples were dropped and 92 samples were used to test.
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Table 5.6

Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test

Test

Statistics

P Value

Student’s t

0.668317

0.5056

Sign

1.5

0.8323

Signed Rank

200

0.4160

The signed rank sum test result shows no statistically significant difference of the
number of purchase choices within two games. This could be concluded that subjects
demonstrated an equal willingness to purchase insurance between two games, although
with difference experimental settings.
Data Analysis
Probability regression
In both games, subjects were asked to report the probabilities that the revenue will
fall below $90 per acre in each period. The regression model trying to examine how the
subjects assess the probability of loss is estimated for each individual subject in both
games:
(5.3)

where probchit is the difference in subject i ’s reported probability between the period t
and the previous one period t  1 ; probch1it is one period lag of probchit , the difference
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in subject i ’s reported probability between the period t  1 and the previous one period

t  2 ; probch2it is two periods lag of probch and probch3it is three periods lag of
probchit and  it is an error term subject to a normal distribution. So the regression

model can also be expressed as follow,
(5.4)

where probi ,t is subject i ’s reported probability in period t and probi ,t 1 is subject i ’s
reported probability in period t  1 , etc.
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Probability regression for Game One
Table 5.7

Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Probability
Regression in Game One

Variable Name

Definition
Sample Mean (s.d.)
The difference of
reported probability
between the current
probability change period t and the
0.14(20.58)
previous one period
t  1 ; probi ,t  probi ,t 1
The difference of
reported probability
between the period
probability change1 t  1 and the period
0.12(20.43)
t 2;
probi ,t 1  probi ,t 2
The difference of
reported probability
between the period
probability change2 t  2 and the period
0.11(20.47)
t  3;
probi ,t 2  probi ,t 3
The difference of
reported probability
between the period
probability change3 t  3 and the period
0.13(20.47)
t 4;
probi ,t 3  probi ,t 4

Min

Max

-100

100

-100

100

-100

100

-100

100

In Game One, there are 8 subjects who reported the same probability of loss
across all the rounds. Due to the lack of sufficient variation in the dependent variable,
only 84 samples are used in the regression for Game One. The regression results are
following in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.8

Results from Probability Regression in Game One

Variable Name

The number of significant
samples out of all used
samples [84]

probability change1

67

probability change2

57

probability change3

27

Positive Sign/
Negative sign
0
67
0
57
1
26

Note: A10% significance level is used
As we can see, one period lag and two periods of lag of probability change are
both significant in more than half of samples and all have a negative sign.
This strong significance of negative signs in one period and two periods lag
variables are telling us that, if there is an increase in the reported probability of loss in
this period compared to the last period, then the reported probability will either increase
but in a smaller scale or even decrease in the next first period and the probability in the
next second period will probably increase a further smaller scale or drop down.
Conversely, if the reported probability in the current period decreases compared
to the last period, the probability in the next first period will either decrease but in a
smaller scale or even bouncing up. The probability in the next second period will
probably decrease in an even smaller scale or even spring back up.
The reported probability is bouncing up and down and subjects were seemingly
looking for the equilibrium of probability of loss. I randomly selected the reported
probability of loss data from 4 subjects whose regression models have significant
probability change lag variables in order to help illustrate the issue (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7

Reported probability of loss from 4 randomly drawn subjects who all have
significant lag probability change variables

Different colors represent different subjects’ reported probability of loss. All of
these four individuals, either those who changed the probability in a strong manner like
subject 4 or those who changed in a mild manner like subject 43, indeed had the reported
probability bounce up and down frequently. However, it is important to evaluate this
behavior given the parent probability of loss is 33%. It can be an interpretation that
subjects were seeking the equilibrium through updating their probability round by round.
However, they were in generally upwardly biased.
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Probability regression for Game Two
In Game Two, the same regression model is estimated,
(5.5)

Table 5.9

Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Probability
Regression in Game Two

Variable Name

Definition
Sample Mean (s.d.)
The difference of
reported probability
between the current
probability change period t and the
-0.04(26.90)
previous one period
t  1 ; probi ,t  probi ,t 1
The difference of
reported probability
between the period
probability change1 t  1 and the period
-0.15(27.01)
t 2;
probi ,t 1  probi ,t 2
The difference of
reported probability
between the period
probability change2 t  2 and the period
-0.51(26.92)
t  3;
probi ,t 2  probi ,t 3
The difference of
reported probability
between the period
probability change3 t  3 and the period
-0.26(27.04)
t 4;
probi ,t 3  probi ,t 4

Min

Max

-100

100

-100

100

-100

100

-100

100

There are two persons who reported the same probability of loss across the
periods. Due to the lack of sufficient variation in dependent variable, 94 samples in the
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end are used in the regression for Game Two. The regression results are following in
Table 5.4.
Table 5.10

Results of Probability Regression in Game Two
The number of significant
samples out of all used
samples [94]

Variable Name
probability change1

92

probability change2

89

probability change3

45

Positive Sign/
Negative sign
0
92
0
89
0
45

Note: at a 10% significance level
Game Two is similar to Game One in regards to the regression results: subjects
changed their probability of loss up and down frequently. This is, however, reasonable in
Game Two where subjects were experiencing randomly selected series of revenues in
every round and started over to perceive the loss probability in the next round. Changing
reported probability could be just a reflection of changing fundamental risk information.
Demand regression
Demand regression model for Game One15
I utilized the logistic function to analyze the insurance demand. The regression
model is represented as

(5.6)
15

I have also investigated a model including square terms of streak variables for a check a quadratic
relationship between purchase choice and streak variable. But no evidence of it was found in estimation
results.
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where the choice  is equal to 1 for purchasing insurance and 0 for no insurance and  it
is an error term subject to a normal distribution.
In the function above, probtit is the subject i ’s reported probability that revenue in
current period will be less than $90 per area. The variables goodyear and badyear are
created to accounts for the effect of streaks of good and bad revenue years on insurance
purchase choice, in order to test the hypothesis of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect.
The values of goodyear were generated in this manner: if the previous period is the third
year in row when the revenue is larger than 90, the current period of goodyear would be
set to 3; if the previous period is the fourth consecutive year when the revenue is larger
than 90, the current period of goodyear would be set to 4, etc. The minimum and
maximum value of goodyear is 0 and 6 respectively (See Table 5.7). Likewise, the
variable badyear was generated in the same fashion. As its maximum value is 4 (See
Table 5.7), it just has three levels, 0, 3 and 4. Since the maximum value of good streak
variable is 6, the first 6 observations of goodyear were set to be missing for each
individual. The first 4 observations of badyear were missing for each individual as well
for the same reason. As to variable period , it refers to the cumulative amount of periods
the subjects have been experiencing, in order to capture the learning process—see
whether or not subjects were learning to purchase crop insurance as more rounds of the
game were running along. Obviously it has 50 values, 0 through 49.
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Table 5.11

Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Demand
Regression without Square Term in Game One

Variable Name

Definition

The purchase choice made by
purchase choice subjects, one for buying, zero
for not buying
The reported probability that
prob
revenue will fall below $90 per
area in the current period
The amount of consecutive bad
years (>2) that subjects have
goodyear
been experiencing before the
current period
The amount of consecutive bad
years (>2) that subjects have
badyear
been experiencing before the
current period
The cumulative amount of
period
periods that subjects have been
experiencing

Sample Mean
(s.d.)

Min

Max

0.55(0.50)

0

1

46.61(22.40)

0

100

1.18(1.92)

0

6

0.39(0.97)

0

4

24.50(14.43)

0
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4 samples in the pool have the same choice across the rounds. Due to a lack of
sufficient variation in dependent variable in some samples, it ends up using 88 samples in
the regression. The regression results are following in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.12

Results from Demand Regression without Square Term in Game One

Variable Name

The number of
significance out
of all used
samples [88]

prob

45

goodyear

9

badyear

8

period

19

Positive
Sign /
Negative
sign
42
3
3
6
7
1
15
4

Note: at 10% significance
From the estimate results we can see that the reported probability variable is
significant in over half of samples in most of which it is positive. It means that the
probability of purchasing choice will increase as the probability of perception of loss
rises, which makes sense. Neither of two streak variables looks statistically significant
since no more than 10 are significant at 10% level for both of them, thereby rejecting the
hypotheses of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect: the subjects in Game One did not
exhibit the behaviors of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect when making decision to
buy insurance. It is interesting to find that there are 15 samples out of 88, where there is a
positive and significant period factor which indicates that subjects were learning to buy
more insurance contracts in Game One as they had been experiencing more rounds.
Demand regression model for Game Two
The demand regression in Game Two has similar factor variables as in Game
One -- probability of loss, period, and streak variables (good streak and bad streak) to
explain the insurance purchase choice. Since the two games have distinctive experimental
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settings, the creations of streak variables were different. In Game Two, A new series of
20 observations was provided in each period for subjects to observe and their probability
perception would start over in the next period; while the histogram remained constant
throughout the game and subjects updated their perceptions only by the new drawn
revenue observation. Therefore, the streak variables are based upon the given 20
observations in each round: if the 20th observation is the third consecutive good year that
revenue is larger than 90, the value of goodyear would be set to 3; if the 20th is the fourth
consecutive good year when the revenue is larger than 90, the current period of
goodyear would be set to 4, etc. Likewise, the variable badyear was created in the same

fashion. Additionally, the reported auto-correlation probability in Game Two was
included in explanatory variables, just for a curiosity about its effect on purchase decision.
Therefore, the demand regression model for Game Two is formulating as follow,
(5.7)
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Table 5.13

Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Demand
Regression in Game Two

Variable Name
Purchase choice
prob

goodyear

badyear

proba
period

Definition
The purchase choice made by
subjects, one for buying, zero for
not buying
The reported probability that
revenue will fall below $90 per
area in the current period
The amount of consecutive good
years (>2) that subjects have
been experiencing before the last
observation in the series shows
up
The amount of consecutive bad
years (>2) that subjects have
been experiencing before the last
observation in the series shows
up
The reported probability that the
revenue series in the period is
correlated
The cumulative amount of
periods that subjects have been
experiencing

Sample Mean
(s.d.)

Min

Max

0.54(0.50)

0

1

46.12(23.29)

0

100

2.76(4.11)

0

16

0.22(1.08)

0

6

46.44(25.11)

0

100

24.50(14.43)

1
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Since there are 3 subjects choosing either buying or not buying all the rounds, the
lack of sufficient variation in dependent variable caused 92 samples to be used in the
regression. The regression results are following in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.14

Results from Demand Regression in Game Two

Variable Name

The number of
significance out
of all used
samples [92]

prob

63

goodyear

2

badyear

1

proba

10

period

16

Positive
Sign /
Negative
sign
61
2
1
1
1
0
2
8
7
9

Note: at 10% significance
Both streak variables have no explanatory power in this model as well as in the
regression of Game One. The fact of insignificance of streak variables rejects the
hypotheses of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect: the subjects did not exhibit the
behaviors of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect when making decisions to buy
insurance. The reported probability of loss is significant for nearly two thirds of samples
and its positive sign implies that an increase in perceived probability of loss leads to a
rise in the probability of demand for insurance policy. On the other hand, the probability
of series being correlated is not statistically significant. Variable period is statistically
significant in some samples but they split the amount of positive and negative signs
which makes it unreliable to explain the demand model.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary
The study set out to explore how two cognitive biases, gambler’s fallacy and hot
hand effect, exert an effect on crop insurance purchase decision. I used experimental
methods to accomplish this objective and designed two financially incentive games that
represented distinct experimental situations. Subjects were assigned to participate in two
subsequent games. Game One, providing an overall revenue histogram at the beginning
of the game, allowed subjects to update risk information and make purchase decision
before a random revenue draw in each period. Game Two showed a new-drawn series
with 21 revenue observations in each round which could be uncorrelated or correlated
with a correlation coefficient of 0.7. Each of the two series had 50-50 chance of being
chosen. Subjects made to purchase insurance after evaluating the risk separately in each
period. In the analysis, I created streak variables that account for the effect of consecutive
good and bad revenue years on demand for insurance. The streak variables in both games
did not show desirable explanatory power to decipher subjects’ purchase behavior;
thereby the hypotheses concerning hot hand effect and gambler’s fallacy were rejected.
In the analysis of probability perception, it is found that subjects changed the loss
probability up and down frequently according to statistically significant probability
change variables in both games. This is consistent with a phenomenon of “mean
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reversion” which is widely used in finance. But the mean is reverting to an upward biased
probability level in Game One because the mean of probability of loss is 46% while the
true loss probability is 33%.
Another important influencing factor, the probability of loss is statistically
significant among most samples; the positive sign of loss probability reported by subjects
strongly demonstrates that subjective probability of risks indeed influences individual’s
crop insurance purchase decision positively. It is also interesting to find that the
experience variable in Game One is statistically significant in some samples to
successfully explain the individual demand for crop insurance. Its positive sign provides
evidence to argue that in a random situation, the longer the exposure to risky events
subjects have, the more willing to engage in insurance protection they are.
Conclusion
Even though the hypotheses of hot hand effect and gambler’s fallacy failed to be
supported, the interesting findings mentioned above still enable me to offer some
constructive suggestions. Concerning the significant effect of subjective probability of
loss risks on purchase decision and the experimental fact that subjects were bouncing up
and down to update the loss probability, seemingly seeking the equilibrium, the farm
bureau or crop insurance companies should establish education programs that are aimed
to train farmers to understanding the principles of probability theory and fundamentals of
risk managements. The finding that the longer subjects were exposed to risks the more
likely they became to buy insurance in the random environment confirms the significance
and necessity of this education program. From the perspective of farmers, a better
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understanding of probability would enable them to discover the risks in the real world
and seek reliable protections.
For future work, this laboratory experiment can be extended to a field study
providing an insightful look into cognitive operations within individual farmers. A lab
experiment with revisions, nevertheless, needs to be tested for a few times before taken
into field due to some shortcomings in my experiment.
Given that some subjects who are very well-educated junior/senior undergraduate
or graduate students showed insufficient understanding of probability theory knowledge
in experiments, it is reasonable to question that farmers without higher education can be
able to understand and apply the knowledge into the problem solution. So I would
suggest that two treatments be created—one with a probability education before
experiment and one without. It needs to test the effect of education program on demand
for crop insurance.
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IRB Approval

The following is the email containing the approval information:

“Dear Mr. Qian:

This email serves as official documentation that the above referenced project was reviewed and
approved via administrative review on 3/11/2014 in accordance with 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).
Continuing review is not necessary for this project. However, in accordance with SOP 01-03
Administrative Review of Applications, a new application must be submitted if the study is
ongoing after 5 years from the date of approval. Additionally, any modification to the project must
be reviewed and approved by the HRPP prior to implementation. Any failure to adhere to the
approved protocol could result in suspension or termination of your project. The HRPP reserves
the right, at any time during the project period, to observe you and the additional researchers on
this project.

Please note that the MSU HRPP accreditation for our human subjects protection program
requires an approval stamp for consent forms. The approval stamp will assist in ensuring the
HRPP approved version of the consent form is used in the actual conduct of research. Your
stamped consent form will be attached in a separate email. You must use the stamped consent
form for obtaining consent from participants.

Please refer to your HRPP number (#14-048) when contacting our office regarding this
application.

Thank you for your cooperation and good luck to you in conducting this research project. If you
have questions or concerns, please contact me at jroberts@orc.msstate.edu or call 662-325-
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2238.

Finally, we would greatly appreciate your feedback on the HRPP approval process. Please take a
few minutes to complete our survey at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/YZC7QQD.

Sincerely,

Jodi Roberts, Ph.D.
IR! B Officer”
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Experiment Instructions
Crop Insurance Purchase Experiment
Thank you for attending today, you will be participating in an economic
experiment where you can earn a payment for participating. To begin, read and sign the
disclosure statement; and you will earn a payment as your show-up fee in Holt-Laury
Choice Task. You will be able to earn more money in this experiment. I will first explain
the experiment and then tell you how you will be able to earn more.

Holt-Laury Lottery Choice Task








The sheet of paper shows ten rows of questions and each question needs a
decision which is a paired choice between “Option A” and “Option B”.
You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of
them will be used in the end to determine your earnings
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are
numbered from 1 to 10 (the “0” face of the die will serve as 10.)
After you have made all your choices, we will throw this die twice, once to select
one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your
payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected.
o For example, look at Question 1 at the top. In Question 1, for the second
throw, the higher prize is paid if the throw of die is 1 and the lower prize
is paid when any other throw appears. For question 2, the higher prize is
paid when the throw is 1 or 2 while the lower prize is paid for 3 through
10.
The other Questions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the
chances of the higher payoff for each option increase.
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting
your earnings.
o You will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each
decision has an equal chance of being used in the end.
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To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each Question row you will have to
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some Question rows and
B for other rows and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.



When you are finished, we will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the ten
Questions will be used.
Then we will throw the die again to determine your money earnings for the
Option you chose for that Question. At last, you write your earnings in the blank
at the top of the page.
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not

talk with anyone while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question.
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Subject No. ___________

Question

Date ___________

Option A

Total Earning ____________

Option B

1

10% chance of $10.00,
90% chance of $8.00

10% chance of $19.00
90% chance of $1.00

2

20% chance of $10.00,
80% chance of $8.00

20% chance of $19.00
80% chance of $1.00

3

30% chance of $10.00,
70% chance of $8.00

30% chance of $19.00,
70% chance of 1.00

4

40% chance of $10.00,
60% chance of $8.00

40% chance of $19.00,
60% chance of $1.00

5

50% chance of $10.00,
50% chance of $8.00

50% chance of $19.00,
50% chance of $1.00

6

60% chance of $10.00,
40% chance of $8.00

60% chance of $19.00,
40% chance of $1.00

7

70% chance of $10.00,
30% chance of $8.00

70% chance of $19.00,
30% chance of $1.00

8

80% chance of $10.00,
20% chance of $8.00

80% chance of $19.00,
20% chance of $1.00

9

90% chance of $10.00,
10% chance of $8.00

90% chance of $19.00,
10% chance of $1.00

10

100% chance of $10.00,
0% chance of $8.00

100% chance of $19.00,
0% chance of $1.00
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Which Option
Is preferred?

Game 1


In this game you will be playing the role of a farmer growing a crop. Like most
crop farmers you do not control either the weather which affects the yield of
your crop or the market price you will receive at harvest time which occurs
approximately six months after you plant the crop.



You are planning to grow 100 acres of the new crop. On average the revenue
from this crop is $100/acre/year but it costs $90/acre/year to grow it. So in total
you will generate $1000 profits on average in each year. There is only one
harvest per year. If yields or harvest prices are low you lose money that year.



To help you understand the revenue risk of this crop we will show you the
following histogram of the revenue for the crop, which are 1000 observations
from the true distribution, on your own computer. You can assume that these
1000 observations are the past 1000 years’ historical revenues and we are going
to have a new 50 years to grow crop. The histogram will NOT change throughout
this game.



However you may purchase an insurance product that protects you from low
revenue. The insurance will work in this manner. If your revenue falls below
$90/acre in a year, the insurance will make up the difference with an indemnity
to you. So
Indemnity=90-revenue, if revenue is less than 90, else indemnity=0
o For example, if revenue is $60 per acre the insurance would pay you $30
per acre or if revenue was $10 per acre the insurance would pay $80 per
acre. However, if revenue is over $90 per acre, the insurance pays
nothing. The cost of this insurance is [$4 per acre].



Then you will be asked to state “what is the probability of collecting insurance
(the probability that revenue falls below $90 per acre) do you think it would be
in the next year”.
o Note you need to input your answer that may fall between 0% meaning
there is no chance you will receive an indemnity in the next period and
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100% meaning you are certain revenue will fall below $90 per acre next
period.


You will be asked “whether or not you are willing to buy an insurance” to
protect you from potential loss from revenue, or not if you think it is too
expensive.
o Noted that this is just a yes-or-no question, and you need to input in the
respective cell, “1” meaning “willing to buy” and “0” meaning “not willing
to buy”.



Please raise your red card to indicate your completion of this question. After
everybody raises their cards, an observation of revenue will be randomly drawn
from the true revenue distribution from which the 1000 historical data
observations were drawn, and shown on the monitor. You need to input the
revenue in the cells by yourself and the net return in this round will be shown up
automatically. To summarize, the average revenue is $100 per acre but the cost
to grow the crop is $90. So you would expect to cost $9000 and make
$1000/year by planting 100 acres of the crop on average. The payoff are coming
as follow,
Net return  crop revenue  cost  insurance indemnity  premium, if insured,
Net return  crop revenue  cost, if not insured.



You will receive one dollar for every $5000 of net return in the game.



The last thing to be noted: the cell will be locked after your input and you
CANNOT go back to edit it. So you’ve just got one chance to input your answer.
Be careful and cherish it!
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Game 2


In this game you will still be playing the role of a farmer growing a crop. Like
most crop farmers you do not control either the weather which affects the yield
of your crop or the market price you will receive at harvest time which occurs
approximately six months after you plant the crop.



You are planning to grow 100 acres of the new crop. On average the revenue
from this crop is $100/acre/year but it costs $90/acre/year to grow it. So in total
you will generate $1000 profits on average in each year. There is only one
harvest per year. If yields or harvest prices are low you lose money that year



However you may purchase an insurance product that protects you from low
revenue. The insurance will work in this manner. If your revenue falls below
$90/acre in a year, the insurance will make up the difference with an indemnity
to you. So
Indemnity = 90 − revenue, if revenue is less than 90, else indemnity = 0.
o For example, if revenue is $60 per acre the insurance would pay you $30
per acre or if revenue was $10 per acre the insurance would pay $80 per
acre. However, if revenue is over $90 per acre, the insurance pays
nothing. The cost of this insurance is $4 per acre.



You will look at 21 observations instead of one in each period. You also need to
know that there is a 50/50 chance that the 21 revenues from one year to the
next are either independent or correlated. That is, if revenues are independent
across time, then the revenue for this year will have no relationship with next
year’s revenue. However, if revenues are correlated then if this year’s revenue
is above average there is a 70% chance next year’s revenue will be above
average. Conversely, if this year’s revenue is below average there would be a
70% chance next year’s revenue will be below average.
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o To help you understand what autocorrelation really means. It can be
defined as “correlation between members of series of observations
ordered in time and space”16
o The following are some graphs to help you further understand correlation:


90% Autocorrelation

16

Maurice G. Kendall and William R. Buckland, A Dictionary of Statistical Terms, Hafner Publishing Company,
New York, 1971, p. 8.
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0% Autocorrelation (Uncorrelated or Independent)



-90% Autocorrelation

With the help of the computer, in each round we will draw 21 observations of
farm revenues, which have a 50/50 chance to be 70% correlated or
uncorrelated, for you to observe. First twenty observations are shown to you
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before you make a decision. The last observation will be shown to you to
determine your net return in this period after you answer the following three
questions.


Based on the twenty observations you were just given,
What is the chance that this crop’s revenue is correlated across time?
[Note your answer may fall between 0% , meaning there is no
chance crop revenue is correlated across time and 100% meaning you are
certain revenue is correlated across time.] Remember there is 50/50
chance revenue is correlated across time or not.
The next question is:
Given the series you are observing, what is the chance that you will
collect an indemnity if you purchase the insurance policy?
[Note your answer may fall between 0% meaning there is no
chance you will receive an indemnity in the next period and 100%
meaning you are certain revenue will fall below $90 next period.]
Then third question is:
Are you willing to pay [4 $/acre] for the insurance policy to protect your
revenue? Answer either yes or no, 1 for “YES” and 0 for “NO”.



Please raise your red card to indicate your completion of this question. After
everybody raises their cards, the computer will show you the last observation
from the series you observed. You need to input the drawn revenue into the
cells by yourself.
o So the actual revenue outcome, according to the explanations above, will
be correlated with the last observation if drawn from the correlated
revenue series; or it will be uncorrelated if the observation is from the
uncorrelated series. This actual revenue will determine the net return
from the farm and any insurance indemnity to be paid.



Your second source of earning from this game will be based on the first question
about whether you think revenues are correlated across time. Remember, the
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question asked you what the chances the crop’s revenue is correlated across
time. The payoff table below shows you that how many points you will obtain
based on your reported probability if the revenues are “correlated’ or
“uncorrelated”. (It does not mean you necessarily need to answer in increments
of 10, you can put any number 0 -100 in percentage) The aggregate earnings
from every period will be averaged and you will receive one dollar for 1000
points earned.
Points

Reported Probability (%)
0

Correlated
Uncorrelated

0

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1

3

5

6

7

8

9

9

9
100
9

900 600 100 400 500 400 100 600 900 10000
9

9

9

8

7

6

5

3

1

10000 900 600 100 400 500 400 100 600 900

0

o Therefore, as you can discern, the best strategy here for you is to
honestly tell us the true evaluation of probabilities.


Finally, you will earn from the revenue for the farm. The average revenue per
acre is $100 but it costs $90 to grow the crop. So you would expect to make
$1000/year in 100 acres on average:

Net return = crop revenue − cost + insurance indemnity − premium, if insured,
Net return = crop revenue − cost, if not insured.
o You will receive one dollar for every $5000 of net return in the game.
o We will conduct 5-10 practice rounds to let you become familiar with the
game and then play for 50 rounds.


The last thing to be noted: the cell will be locked after your input and you
CANNOT go back to edit it. So you’ve just got one chance to input your answer.
Be careful and cherish it!
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After the completion of experiment, please leave your answer sheet and the
instructions on the table and do not take them out of computer lab. Thank you.
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APPENDIX B
SAS CODE FOR DATA ANALYSIS
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dm log 'clear' output ;
dm output 'clear' output;
libname normal'C:\Users\pq17\Desktop\Experiment Data\Mass Data
Analysis\SAS Analysis\GAME1\normal';
dm log 'clear' output ;
dm output 'clear' output;
libname ROUNDS 'C:\Users\pq17\Desktop\Experiment Data\Mass Data
Analysis\SAS Analysis\GAME2\rounds';
/*scoring rule in Game One;/
data normal.game1;
set normal.game1;
dev_rp=(pi-33)**2; *deviation from real probability;
run;
proc sql;
create table normal.game1_scoring as
select sum(dev_rp) as sum_rp from normal.game1
group by sub
order by sub;
data normal.game1_scoring;
set normal.game1_scoring;
sqrt_rp=sqrt(sum_rp);
run;
proc sort data=normal.game1_scoring;
by sub;
run;
data normal.game1_scoring (keep=sub sqrt_rp rename=(sqrt_rp = score));
set normal.game1_scoring;
by sub;
if last.sub then output;
run;
/*scoring rule in Game Two;/
data rounds.qsr;
input sub qsr;
cards;
1
6790.5
2
7447
3
6823.5
4
6938.5
5
6845
6
6428.54
7
7289.04
8
6607.38
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

7039
7438
6760
7035.9
6433.5
6983
7306
7140.6
7069.5
7141.52
7651.32
6753.08
7152
7437
5976.92
6724
7353.12
7503.52
6760.44
6765.66
6575.86
7052.08
6517.42
7302
7480
7269.5
6789.5
6708.4
7228
7446
6295.8
6980
7245.16
7292
6127
7138.5
6527
7127.3
5316.918367
6708.52
7170
6804.5
7354
6810
6392
7515.5
7067
5855.7
6030
7359
7299.06
7289.56
6869.38
7422
7576.3
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64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
;
run;

7134
7106
7145
7229.5
6705.8
7396
7250.44
6542
6794.26
6585
7094
6800
7001.92
6723.5
5914
7302.5
6217
6432
7364
7469
7504.92
7379.38
6627.5
7051.5
6593.42
6875.5
7241
7288.5
7404.96
7052.44
6936.32
5839

data rounds.game2_scoring;
merge rounds.game2 rounds.qsr;
by sub;
run;
data rounds.game2_scoring (keep=sub qsr);
set rounds.game2_scoring;
score=qsr/1000;
drop qsr
run;
/*purchase choice in Game One;/
data normal.game1_count;
set normal.game1;
if c=1 then count+1;
if first.sub then do;
if c=0 then count=0;
if c=1 then count=1;
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end;
by sub;
if last.sub then output;
run;
/*perceived correlation compared to true correlation;/
data one;
input period corr;
datalines;
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
1
5
0
6
0
7
1
8
1
9
1
10
0
11
1
12
1
13
0
14
1
15
0
16
0
17
1
18
1
19
1
20
0
21
0
22
0
23
1
24
1
25
0
26
1
27
1
28
1
29
0
30
1
31
0
32
0
33
0
34
1
35
1
36
0
37
0
38
1
39
1
40
1
41
0
42
0
43
1
44
0
45
0
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46
47
48
49
50
;
run;

1
0
1
0
0

proc sql;
create table rounds.corr as
select one.period, sub, pa, one.corr
from rounds.game2 as a, one
where a.period=one.period
order by period;
data rounds.corr1;
set rounds.corr;
if pa=50 then subcorr=1;else if pa<50 then subcorr=0; else
subcorr=99;
if subcorr=99 then t=99;
if corr=1 and subcorr^=99 then do;
if subcorr=1 then t=1;
if subcorr=0 then t=3;
end;
if corr=0 and subcorr^=99 then do;
if subcorr=0 then t=4;
if subcorr=1 then t=2;
end;
if t^=99 then output;
run;
proc freq data=rounds.corr1;
table t;
run;
/*purchase choice in Game One;/
data normal.game1_count;
set normal.game1;
if c=1 then count+1;
if first.sub then do;
if c=0 then count=0;
if c=1 then count=1;
end;
by sub;
if last.sub then output;
run;

/*purchase choice in Game Two;/
data rounds.game2_count;
set rounds.game2;
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if c=1 then count+1;
if first.sub then do;
if c=0 then count=0;
if c=1 then count=1;
end;
by sub;
if last.sub then output;
run;
/*test for the normality of purchase choices in two games;/
proc univariate data=normal.game1_count normal;
var count_of_purchase;
run;
proc univariate data=rounds.game2_count normal;
var count_of_purchase;
run;

/*test for the difference of purchase choices within individual in two
games;/
proc sql;
create table normal.compare1 as
select a.sub, (a.count_of_purchase-b.count_of_purchase) as diff
from normal.game1_count as a, (select * from rounds.game2_count
group by sub
having count(*) not in (42, 43, 88)) as b
where a.sub=b.sub;
proc univariate data=normal.compare1;
var diff;
run;
/*probability regression in Game One;/
data normal.game1_pc;
set normal.game1 (drop = gy1--gy6 by1_--zg2
rename=(pichange=pch));
pch1=lag(pch);
pch2=lag2(pch);
pch3=lag3(pch);
do i=0 to 91;
if _n_=1+50*i then do;
pch1=.;
pch2=.;
pch3=.;
end;
if _n_=2+50*i then do;
pch1=.;
pch2=.;
pch3=.;
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end;
if _n_=3+50*i then do;
pch2=.;
pch3=.;
end;
if _n_=4+50*i then do;
pch3=.;
end;
end;
run;
proc means data=normal.game1_pc maxdec=2;
var pch pch1 pch2 pch3;
run;

proc reg data=normal.game1_pc;
model pch = pch1 pch2 pch3;
by sub;
ods output ParameterEstimates=normal.pc_Est
FitStatistics=normal.pc_fit;
run;
%macro sign(set=, testvar = );
%let k=1;
%let var = %scan(&testvar, &k);
%do %while (&var NE);
data normal.&set;
set normal.&set;
if variable ="&var" then do;
if 0<probt<0.1 then
do;
if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1;
else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1;
end;
end;
run;
proc freq data=normal.&set;
tables sig_&var
run;
%let k=%eval(&k+1);
%let var=%scan(&testvar, &k);
%end;
%mend;
%sign(set=pc_est, testvar=pch1 pch2 pch3);

/*probability regression in Game Two;/
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data rounds.game2_pc;
set rounds.game2 (drop = gy1--gy6 by1_--zg2
rename=(pichange=pch));
pch1=lag(pch);
pch2=lag2(pch);
pch3=lag3(pch);
run;
data rounds.game2_pc;
set rounds.game2_pc;
do i=0 to 91;
if _n_=1+50*i then do;
pch1=.;
pch2=.;
pch3=.;
end;
if _n_=2+50*i then do;
pch1=.;
pch2=.;
pch3=.;
end;
if _n_=3+50*i then do;
pch2=.;
pch3=.;
end;
if _n_=4+50*i then do;
pch3=.;
end;
end;
run;
proc means data= rounds.game2_pc maxdec=2;
var pch pch1 pch2 pch3;
run;

proc reg data= rounds.game2_pc;
model pch = pch1 pch2 pch3;
by sub;
ods output ParameterEstimates=rounds.pc_Est
FitStatistics=rounds.pc_fit;
run;
%macro sign(set=, testvar = );
%let k=1;
%let var = %scan(&testvar, &k);
%do %while (&var NE);
data rounds.&set;
set rounds.&set;
if variable ="&var" then do;
if 0<probt<0.1 then
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do;
if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1;
else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1;
end;
end;
run;
proc freq data=rounds.&set;
tables sig_&var
run;
%let k=%eval(&k+1);
%let var=%scan(&testvar, &k);
%end;
%mend;
%sign(set=pc_est, testvar=pch1 pch2 pch3);
/*demand regression without square terms in Game One;/

data normal.game1_pc;
set normal.game1_pc;
do i=0 to 91;
if 1+50*i<=_n_<=4+50*i then do;
gy=.;
by=.;
end;
if 5+50*i<=_n_<=6+50*i then gy=.;
end;
run;
data normal.game1_pc;
set normal.game1_pc;
if 0<=gy<3 then gy=0;
if 0<=by<2 then by=0;
gysq=gy*gy;
bysq=by*by;
run;
data normal.game1_pc;
set normal.game1_pc;
period1=lag(period);
do i=0 to 91;
if _n_=1+50*i then period1=0;
end;
run;

proc means data=normal.game1_pc maxdec=2;
var c pi gy by period1 gysq bysq;
run;
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proc logistic data=normal.game1_pc ;
model c (event='1') = pi gy by period1 / firth maxiter=99999;
by sub;
ods output ParameterEstimates=normal.choice_Est
FitStatistics=normal.choice_fit;
run;

%macro sign_chi(set=, testvar = );
%let k=1;
%let var = %scan(&testvar, &k);
%do %while (&var NE);
data normal.&set;
set normal.&set;
if variable ="&var" then do;
if 0<probchisq<0.1 then
do;
if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1;
else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1;
end;
end;
run;
proc freq data=rounds.&set;
tables sig_&var
run;
%let k=%eval(&k+1);
%let var=%scan(&testvar, &k);
%end;
%mend;

%sign_chi(set=choice_est, testvar=pi gy by period1)
/*demand regression without square terms in Game Two;/
proc logistic data=normal.game1_pc ;
model c (event='1') = pi gy by gysq bysq period1 / firth
maxiter=99999;
by sub;
ods output ParameterEstimates=normal.choice_Est
FitStatistics=normal.choice_fit;
run;
%sign_chi(set=choice_est, testvar=pi gy by gysq bysq period1)

/*demand regression in Game Two;/
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data rounds.one;
input period goodyear badyear;
datalines;
1
0
1
2
0
1
3
2
0
4
0
1
5
2
0
6
6
0
7
0
1
8
5
0
9
4
0
10
10
0
11
0
2
12
2
0
13
8
0
14
16
0
15
0
1
16
0
2
17
7
0
18
8
0
19
1
0
20
0
1
21
12
0
22
4
0
23
0
5
24
1
0
25
1
0
26
1
0
27
11
0
28
0
6
29
1
0
30
7
0
31
2
0
32
1
0
33
11
0
34
0
1
35
1
0
36
0
1
37
1
0
38
5
0
39
1
0
40
3
0
41
0
2
42
3
0
43
5
0
44
0
1
45
4
0
46
1
0
47
1
0
48
9
0
49
0
2
50
0
2
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;
run;
proc sort data=rounds.game2;
by sub;
run;
data rounds.game2;
set rounds.game2;
period+1;
if first.sub then period=1;
by sub;
run;
proc sql;
create table rounds.g2 as
select *
from rounds.game2 as a,
two as b
where a.period=b.period
order by sub, period;
quit;
data rounds.g2;
set rounds.g2;
period1=lag(period);
do i=0 to 94;
if _n_=1+50*i then period1=0;
end;
drop i;
run;
proc means data=rounds.g2 maxdec=2;
var c pi pa goodyear badyear period1;
run;
proc logistic data=rounds.g2;
model c (event='1') = pi pa goodyear badyear period1/ firth
maxiter=99999;
by sub;
ods output ParameterEstimates=rounds.est;
run;
%macro sign_chisq(set=, testvar = );
%let k=1;
%let var = %scan(&testvar, &k);
%do %while (&var NE);
data rounds.&set;
set rounds.&set;
if variable ="&var" then do;
if 0<probchisq<0.1 then
do;
if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1;
else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1;
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end;
end;
run;
proc freq data=rounds.&set;
tables &var;
run;
%let k=%eval(&k+1);
%let var=%scan(&testvar, &k);
%end;
%mend;
%sign_chisq(set=est, testvar=pi pa goodyear badyear period1)
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